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ATTACHMENT FOR TESTIMONY OF

WALLACE E. OLSON

CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE
OF AUDITORS

JUNE 16, 1976

THE INDEPENDENCE OF AUDITORS

INTRODUCTION

The work of the public accounting profession in recent
years has attracted a high level of attention within the business
community and governmental circles.

This increased interest and

visibility has resulted in large part from a growing recognition

of the importance of obtaining assurance regarding the reliability
of financial statements.

As the nation’s economy has grown in size and complexity,
the Federal government has found it increasingly necessary to en
gage in more extensive planning and control.

At the same time, our

system of capital formation and the functioning of our capital mar

kets have become more widely recognized as essential to the continuing
health of the economy.

The availability of reliable financial data

is necessary to the establishment of sound economic policies and
the maintenance of capital markets which attract a broad base of in

vestors.

The CPA’s role as auditor of financial statements is indis

pensable to fulfilling this need.

Thus it is important that CPAs

perform in a manner that warrants widespread confidence in their work.
During the last decade, there have been increasing ex

pressions of doubt about whether CPAs were, in fact, performing
a satisfactory level in their capacity as auditors.

Criticism of

the profession has been voiced by a variety of interested
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parties including financial analysts, financial reporters,
academics, government officials and CPAs themselves.

The critics have not always clearly stated the basis

of their concerns or expectations but their principal complaints
generally fall into two broad categories:
1.

Audits have not been sufficiently effective

in alerting users of financial statements
to material irregularities and impending

financial disasters.
2.

Financial statements prepared in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles

have not adequately portrayed economic reality.
These criticisms stem largely from the collapse of

several large companies during the late 1960s and early 1970s and

hundreds of lawsuits against CPA firms in those and other cases.

Some of these business failures involved management fraud which was
not detected by the auditors.

Some frauds involved management’s

distortion of the substance of complex business transactions by
arranging them in a form that complied with generally accepted
accounting principles but violated their intended result.

It is important to note, however, that the great majority
of unanticipated business failures have come as a surprise because
of honest misjudgments about future business prospects.

The
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miscalculations about markets for bowling alleys, franchising,
commercial aircraft and real estate developments are but a few

examples of one of the major causes of business failures in
recent years.

More recently, the revelations about corporate bribes
and illegal political contributions have raised further questions

about the performance of auditors and whether they should be
responsible for detecting and publicly disclosing illegal cor
porate acts.

In addition, the energy crisis has resulted in

challenges to the reliability of the financial reports of the

oil and gas companies -- a development which, in turn, reflects
growing skepticism about the work of their auditors.

All of these concerns appear to reflect a pervasive

feeling that auditors are not sufficiently independent of their
clients.

Since the usefulness of the auditor’s work depends on

his independence — in appearance as well as in fact — it is

imperative that the expressed doubts concerning independence

be fully explored and satisfactorily resolved.
this paper is devoted to that objective.

The balance of

No attempt is made to

deal with the adequacy of existing auditing and accounting
standards or the methods of their development.

These are

subjects which deserve extensive and separate treatment.

The

focus of this paper will be on the degree to which the application

of auditing and accounting standards is affected by pressures
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on auditors that might impair their independence.

THE CONCEPT OF AUDIT INDEPENDENCE
An understanding of the concept of audit independence

requires a knowledge of the basic reasons why audits are useful.

Users of financial statements who are not in a position to satisfy
themselves directly as to their fairness must have some means of

obtaining reasonable assurance.

Because those who are responsible

for the representations in financial statements are employees or

principals of the issuers, they cannot be expected to be unfailingly
impartial in portraying the financial condition and results of

operations of their respective business enterprises.

Thus the

users of financial statements must look to others to gain a

greater measure of confidence that statements are fairly presented.
It is this need which is met by the examination conducted by an
external auditor and by his professional opinion as to whether the
financial statements are presented fairly in conformity with

generally accepted accounting principles.
In order to fulfill this role, the auditor must be

someone who is not only outside the business enterprise, but is

as free as possible from the influence of its management and owners
and from other conflicts which might impair his objectivity.
Once these conditions have been satisfactorily met, the outside
auditor is uniquely qualified to make an expert investigation

and add credibility to the financial statements.

Under these
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circumstances, the more an auditor is involved in the work
which enters into the preparation of financial statements the

greater will be his knowledge of their content and fairness of

presentation in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles.

This is an important fact to keep in mind when

considering how far an auditor ought to go in providing services
to an audit client.

This will be examined in more detail later

in this paper.

To assure that auditors maintain a satisfactory posture
of impartiality, the profession has included a rule in its code

of ethics which prohibits two types of relationships with
audit clients:
1.

Financial interests in connection with a
business entity which is the subject of

•

an audit.
2.

Serving the audited entity in a capacity
which would cause the auditor to be in

fact or essentially equivalent to being

an officer, director or employee of the

entity.
These relationships are described in more detail in

Rule 101 of the Institute’s Rules of Conduct which is attached
as Appendix A.

This rule has been further elaborated on by

a series of interpretations and rulings of the Ethics Committee

of the AICPA, copies of which are attached as Appendix B.
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The rule recognizes that it is the nature of an

auditor's relationship with his client that determines whether
he is satisfactorily impartial.

Thus, in examining the

question of auditor independence, it is necessary to analyze
the various kinds of relationships which may exist and weigh

their potential for impairing an auditor’s independence.

The term "independence" has been traditionally used

by the profession to describe the required integrity and

objectivity of auditors and it is those qualities which are
the essence of professionalism.

Because independence is intended

to describe a state of mind which is judged on the basis of
existing relationships with a client, it is a complex concept

that is difficult to define.

For example, an unacceptable state

of mind would exist for audit purposes if the auditor is so
influenced by the pressures of conflicts of interest that:

1.

His objectivity would be unwittingly
impaired to the point that he would in

good faith provide his assurance that
misleading financial statements are
reliable.
2.

He would knowingly provide his assurance

that misleading financial statements are

reliable.
integrity.

This would be a loss of his
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The state of mind implied by the term "integrity" is

also an important concept in determining degrees of legal
culpability.

Concepts such as scienter or reckless disregard

of the facts have evolved as standards of evidence that a
knowing dishonest act was committed.

On the other hand, the

notion of simple negligence or mistakes made in good faith
have generally been used as a standard of evidence that a dis
honest state of mind did not exist.

When judging the integrity or objectivity of auditors

it is almost always necessary to rely on circumstantial
evidence as to their state of mind.

This evidence consists

largely of appearances in the light of relationships which exist

between an auditor and his client.

These relationships take a

variety of forms, some of which are impossible to avoid since

all audits require that there be certain basic types of contact
and arrangements between auditors and their clients’ personnel.

If judgments with respect to the integrity or
objectivity (independence) of auditors are to be made fairly,

they must include the following:

1.

A knowledge of the relevant facts.

2.

Application of reasonable standards as
observed by society in general.

3.

Recognition of pressures which would

tend to impair an auditor’s integrity

or objectivity.
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4.

Recognition of countervailing pressures

which tend to assure the maintenance of
an auditor's integrity or objectivity.

5.

Evaluation of the likely composite
impact of conflicting pressures in the

light of normal strength of character

and human behavior under the circumstances.
In making these judgments, it should be recognized
that total independence is an unattainable goal.

As long as

there are relationships of any kind between an auditor and
his client there will be opportunity for doubt whether those

relationships have resulted in unwitting or knowing bias in
favor of the client.

Auditors cannot practice their calling and participate
in the world’s affairs without being exposed to situations

that involve the possibility of pressures on their integrity
and objectivity.

To define and proscribe all such situations

would be impracticable.

To ignore the problem for that reason,

however, and to set no limits at all would be irresponsible.

It follows that the concept of independence should
not be interpreted so loosely as to permit relationships likely
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to impair the auditor’s integrity or objectivity nor so strictly

as to. inhibit the rendering of useful services when the likelihood
of such impairment is relatively remote.
The following sections describe more specifically
some of the prevalent types of relationships and pressures
that have a bearing on where the line should be drawn to

maintain an appropriate degree of independence on the part of

auditors.

RELATIONSHIPS WHICH CREATE
PRESSURES ON INDEPENDENCE
Certain relationships have long been regarded as
posing such a serious threat to the independence of auditors

that they have been prohibited under Rule 101 (Appendix A
attached) of the profession’s code of professional ethics.
Under this rule auditors are prohibited from expressing opinions

on the financial statements of a client if, with certain quali
fications, they
1.

Have any financial interest in the client.

2.

Have a material joint closely-held business
investment with the client.

3.

Have a loan either to or from the client.

-10-

4.

Are connected with the client as a promoter,
underwriter or voting trustee, director,

officer or in a capacity equivalent to a
member of management or an employee.

5.

Are trustees or executors of trusts or
estates having any financial interest in

the client.

6.

Are trustees for any pension or profitsharing trust of the client.

These prohibitions have received a high degree of

compliance within the profession and are being rigidly enforced.

Accordingly, the relationships described under the rule need
not be examined further except to note that in some respects
the proscriptions have been made exceptionally stringent to

facilitate their enforcement.

For example, it is difficult to

assert that ownership of one share of stock in a multi-national
client would be likely to impair an auditor’s independence.

This

is prohibited, however, because it would be difficult to establish
the precise point at which the size of an investment in a client

would tip the scales.

To this extent the profession has bent

over backwards to maintain its appearance of independence.

Among the relationships which are not prohibited and
which are perhaps most frequently cited by the profession’s critics

as a basis of concern are the fact that auditors:
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1.

Are appointed and paid by the clients which

they audit.
2.

Provide a variety of non-audit services
that entail acting in the role of advisor

or advocate for their audit clients.

Inherent in the first of these concerns is the suspicion
that auditors might unduly favor a client's wishes when making

difficult judgments in the course of an audit.

The concern is based

on the assumption that the fear of losing a client and the resulting

effect on the auditor's income or prestige is sufficient to cause him

to be less than objective.
The second concern arises from the belief of some that

providing services in the role of advisor or advocate to an audit

client will, in some instances, result in an auditor having to
pass judgment on the reporting of financial data that is a result

of his own advice or actions in behalf of the client.

The types

of service most frequently cited as causes for alarm involve

acting as an advisor on matters that are furthest removed from
the traditional field of accounting.

On the other hand, consulting

on matters that are more directly related to accounting seems to
generate less concern.

This ambivalent attitude toward consulting

raises questions about the validity of the allegations that impair

ment of an auditor's objectivity is the real concern.

More likely

it is competence rather than independence that is being questioned.

Other types of relationships with clients which are
not prohibited are those which are purely social in nature.

While
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it is recognized that a close personal friendship between an

auditor and a principal officer of the client could pose a problem
it would be difficult to know where to draw the line of impro
priety.

All of the relationships with audit clients described
above — whether currently prohibited or not — hold at least

some potential for eroding the objectivity or integrity of auditors.
To argue otherwise would be less than realistic.

However, an

appraisal of the impact of these pressures on the performance of

auditors must take into account the countervailing pressures

which influence auditors to maintain their independence.

It should

be recognized that elimination of all conflicts of interest is

generally not practicable in any area of economic or social life.
The objective should be to reduce the potential risks to an acceptable

level.

The pressures which achieve this objective with respect to

auditors are explored in the following section.

COUNTERVAILING PRESSURES

There are two general factors that would normally
cause auditors to resist pressures in their dealings with clients.

The first of these is a strong sense of personal probity and
professional pride that is inculcated in every CPA as a part of
his professional training.

The second is the fact that CPAs

typically serve a large number of different clients and are,

therefore, not beholden to any single client for their livelihood.

-13However, the independence of auditors does not depend

solely on these traditional conditions.

some very powerful forces.

They are augmented by

Principal among these are the threat

of lawsuits and the risk of losing the right to practice.
The scores of lawsuits against auditors, spawned
principally by business failures, have caused great concern
among CPA firms.

Confronted by the ever-present threat of

litigation, auditors would have to be foolhardy in the extreme
to risk their careers by being less than objective in performing their

audits.
They also face the possible loss of their rights to prac

tice by revocation of their CPA certificates by state boards of
accountancy.

Such action would almost certainly follow any

decision in the courts that an auditor had acted dishonestly.

This threat and the exposure to legal liability generate pressures

of such severity that they would normally be expected to pre
vail over the impact of most types of relationships with audit
clients.

There are, however, additional pressures reinforcing

the independence of auditors.

If found guilty of violating the

code of professional ethics by the profession’s disciplinary bodies,
an auditor’s reputation would be greatly impaired — thus diminish
ing his ability to attract and retain clients and staff.

Sanctions

imposed by the profession’s disciplinary bodies moreover, would
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doubtless lead to similar action by state boards of accountancy.
The profession has also instigated and supported a
number of important programs and procedures to enhance the

ability of auditors to resist pressures on their independence.

The establishment and strengthening of corporate audit
committees composed of non-management directors has long been
advocated by the AICPA.

This effort has now gained considerable

momentum and promises to provide substantial safeguards to protect

the freedom of auditors from undue management influence.
The AICPA also worked closely with the SEC in urging

and assisting in the development of that agency’s requirements

that information on changes in auditors be included in Form 8K
reports of registrants.

This reporting requirement is designed

to disclose those cases in which auditors were dismissed because

they did not agree with management’s financial statements and
were unwilling to express an unqualified opinion unless the

statements were changed.

The position of auditors is strengthened

by this procedure because management is more inclined to seek

agreement than to engage new auditors and explain its action

in a public report.

Another important safeguard is provided by the
program of quality control review employed within CPA firms.
Partners or independent reviewers who have not been directly

involved in a specific audit evaluate the judgments and work
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of those who have performed the audit before a report is
These reviews are supplemented by post-release reviews

issued.

of samples of audits performed by operating offices of the firms.

Such intra-firm reviews of the quality of the work of operating
offices are conducted periodically by teams of qualified audit
personnel, generally partners, from other operating offices of

the firm.
Similar quality control reviews of firms are also

carried out independently or under a program sponsored by the
AICPA.

Under the program, reviews are conducted either by other CPA

firms as a professional engagement or by panels of auditors drawn
by the AICPA from other firms.

A detailed description of this

program is attached as Appendix C.

The combination of the foregoing mechanisms, coupled

with penalties which can be imposed for inadequate performance,

provide a formidable defense against the possibility that an
auditor will yield to pressures which might tend to impair his
objectivity or integrity.

As a result, the number of cases in

which auditors have clearly succumbed to a client's demands at the
expense of the public interest has been exceedingly small.

This is not to say that there have been no failures
in the execution of audit procedures nor any defective judgments

exercised in grey areas in which the appropriate accounting and
reporting was difficult to determine because it depended on the

-16outcome of future events.

In any profession, it would be unreason

able and prohibitively expensive to impose a standard of zero

defects and this is especially so with respect to the auditing
of financial statements.

The existence of fallibility in execution,

however, should not be misconstrued as incontestable evidence that

auditors lack objectivity or integrity.

ALTERNATIVES SUGGESTED
BY CRITICS

In addition to the restraints against loss of independence

imposed by exposure to legal liability, loss of rights to practice,
disciplinary sanctions by the profession, the safeguards provided by

corporate audit committees, SEC requirements on reporting changes
of auditors and the profession’s quality control review programs,

a number of more radical steps have been proposed by critics.
One such proposal is that companies should be required

to engage new auditors every three to five years.

It is asserted

that required rotation would provide auditors with greater freedom

from influence by management because their limited tenure would
minimize fear of losing a client.
At first blush, a rotation requirement might seem

beneficial in bolstering the independence of auditors.

However,

a considerable price would be paid for such a requirement.

The

most effective audits are generally performed by auditors who have
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acquired a thorough knowledge of the business entity under

review.

It is generally recognized that such knowledge is

best gained through actual audit experience over a considerable

period of years.

This level of expertise would be substantially

dissipated by a system of periodic rotation.
Furthermore, the costs of audits would increase

because of frequent duplications of start-up learning time and

development of a background data base that underlies every
audit.

Also, the intense competition by CPA firms to attract

clients up for rotation would tend to create such severe pressures
on auditor independence that the net result of rotation would be a

decrease rather than an increase of independence.

CPA firms have for many years rotated their personnel
on audit engagements to bring fresh viewpoints to bear on the

audit process.

This is accomplished on a gradual basis which

permits the retention of continuity, thereby avoiding many of
the disadvantages that would result from the rotation of firms.

To the extent that there are advantages to be gained by rotation,

they are largely achieved by these alternative procedures of
systematically bringing new personnel into audit engagements.

It should also recognized that rotation of firms

could have an adverse effect on the ability of auditors to obtain
information from their clients.

The effectiveness of audits

depends to a substantial degree on the maintenance of an
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This attitude would not be as readily developed if there were
frequent changes in auditors and clients would tend to be less

open in discussing their affairs.
When all of these factors are considered it seems

likely that on balance a requirement to rotate audit firms would
weaken rather than strengthen the independence and effectiveness

of auditors and the costs of audits would be increased.

Accord

ingly the proposal should not be adopted because it would be

counter-productive.

A second proposal that is often advanced by the
profession’s critics is that the scope of services of auditors

be restricted to preclude those services which are perceived
to create adverse pressures on the objectivity and integrity

of auditors.

There are varying opinions among the critics as

to what specific services should be prohibited and whether

the restriction should extend only to audit clients or to all

clients regardless of whether audits are performed for such
clients.
Among the services which have been cited as posing a
threat to auditor independence are the following broad categories:
1.

Advice leading to management decisions and
assistance with systems and their implementation.
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2.

Preparation of accounting records or

financial statements which are subse
quently audited by the preparing firm.

The concern underlying both of these categories is that
an auditor may be biased in reporting on the reliability of financial
statements based upon the results of decisions or systems in which

he played an advisory role or assisted in their implementation.

It

is alleged that under such circumstances an auditor would be reluctant
to concede that his advice or assistance to the client has been faulty.

This reluctance would be evidenced by expressing a favorable opinion
on financial statements that failed to reflect any adverse results

of the auditor’s services to the client.
No doubt the providing of non-audit services to audit clients

could create some potential for conflicts that might affect the
objectivity or integrity of auditors.

Indeed, even judgments made

as a part of conducting an audit could cause an auditor to be defensive
about such judgments in a succeeding audit when events may have proved

him wrong.

But the risks of impairment of objectivity or integrity

are so minimal in relation to the benefits that accrue from providing

non-audit services that prohibition of such services would be unwarranted
and undesirable.

Consulting services help management to achieve

efficient business operations and auditors are uniquely qualified to

provide them because of their knowledge gained through observation and

analysis of the activities of a wide range of clients.

In addition,
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are highly beneficial to the effectiveness of their audits.

The

quality of audit judgments frequently depends on the application
of expert knowledge about business operations and practices.
There are many reasons to conclude that the risks of
providing consulting services to audit clients are not significant.

The most important of these are:
1.

No evidence has been produced that pro
viding services involving an advisory

role or assistance with implementation has

in fact impaired the objectivity or
integrity of auditors.

2.

Auditors providing such services are likely
to be constrained by the strong counter

vailing pressures of threat of lawsuits,

loss of reputation and disciplinary action

leading to loss of rights to practice.

3.

Auditors are by training, background and
experience inclined to resist the various

pressures on their independence.
4.

Management is not likely to conspire with

auditors to issue financial statements that

hide the results of poor advice or assistance
by the auditors.
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5.

Auditors do not express opinions on the
quality of management or management decisions.
Their opinions relate only to financial state

ments.

Thus auditors do not express direct

opinions about their own advice or assistance

and are not under strong pressure to agree

to the issuance of financ
ial statements that
distort operating results.

6.

Providing non-audit services provides an
auditor with a more intimate knowledge of
a client’s affairs and enhances his ability

•

to perform an effective audit because of
his understanding of the business.

Thus

the more an auditor is professionally in

volved in the preparation of financial
statements and the underlying accounting
records the greater will be his knowledge

of them and his ability to form an
opinion about the fairness of the state

ments.

The argument by critics that auditors cannot audit

their own work, consisting of non-audit services, misses the
main purpose of an audit which is to obtain a degree of confi
dence from someone outside the control of management.

An auditor

-22does not fall under the control of management simply by rendering
non-audit services.

Thus his ability to lend credibility to

financial statements should not be diminished.

To the contrary,

he will know more about the client and its affairs and is likely

to be a more effective auditor.

The main objective of an audit

is achieved because an outside party, the auditor, is passing
judgment on the fairness of management’s representations in the
financial statements.

All of the foregoing factors, coupled with the fact

that auditors serve many clients and provide all their services
from the posture of an outside contractor, tend to keep pressures
on their objectivity and integrity within acceptable limits.
On balance, then, the disadvantages would far outweigh the

benefits if auditors were precluded from providing non-audit ser

vices to their audit clients.
Most of the other suggestions of critics are directed

at changing the fact that auditors are appointed and paid for their
services by their audit clients.

Some have proposed that auditors

be paid out of a pool of funds created by assessments against com
panies subject to audit.

This misses the principal issue since

it is the appointment of the auditor which counts rather than how
he is paid.
Others have suggested that a government agency have the
power to appoint and dismiss auditors or that all audits be con

-23ducted by government employees rather than by members of a private
profession.

These proposals are so drastic that if they were adopted
they would virtually destroy any vestiges of a private profession.
Such an invasion of the private sector by government would not

seem warranted in the light of the many achievements of the pub
lic accounting profession and the advantages of its retention.

Indeed, there is no assurance that a government bureaucracy would
perform the audit function nearly as well as the private profession.

It has been alleged, for example, that government regulatory agencies

tend to become protective of the industries they regulate and are
less independent in their relationships than are private auditors.

Furthermore, transfer of the audit function to a government agency
runs the risk, that it may be used for partisan political purposes.

Short of converting the private profession to a govern
ment function there would seem to be no practical alternative to

the present system under which auditors are appointed and paid by

their clients.

In any event, the pressures that stem from a fear

of dismissal and loss of fees are probably not nearly as great
as might be contended by critics of the profession.

Also, the

countervailing pressures which have been previously cited are
of such magnitude that any drastic changes in the present system
would seem to be unwarranted.

CONCLUSIONS

To sum up, auditors cannot practice their calling without

-24being exposed to pressures on their integrity and objectivity.

To define and proscribe all such situations would be impracticable.
The pressures that accompany normal relationships with
clients are offset by powerful countervailing restraints.

These

include the possibility of legal liability, professional disci

pline involving revocation of the right to practice, loss of
reputation and the inculcated resistance of a professional to any
infringement upon his basic objectivity and integrity.
In deciding which types of relationships should be

prohibited, both the magnitude of the threat posed by a relation

ship and the force of countervailing pressures have to be weighed.
Such judgments should be based on whether reasonable men, having
knowledge of all the facts and taking into consideration normal
strength of character and normal behavior under the circumstances,
would conclude that a particular relationship would pose an unaccept

able threat to an auditor’s objectivity or integrity.
The profession has applied these criteria in establishing
its prohibitions of relationships between auditors and their

clients.

It believes that those prohibitions are being scrupu

lously observed and are adequate to assure the independence of

auditors.
The profession has also taken steps to minimize the
pressures on auditors by urging the establishment of corporate

audit committees and assisting in the development of reporting
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requirements on changes in auditors.

Safeguards to assure a

high level of performance have also been imposed by adopting and
carrying on extensive quality control review programs and re

quiring continuing professional education by practitioners.

In short, the profession is doing all that can reasonably
be expected to assure that a high level of independence is main

tained by auditors.

However, no procedures or system of con

straints, whether self-imposed or invoked by government, can pro

vide a guarantee of zero defects.
Even though there have been failures in the performance

of auditors they have been minuscule in number in relation to the

overall volume of audits performed.

When failures have occurred

they have rarely involved impairment of objectivity or integrity.

In almost all instances, audit judgments were found to be faulty
in the light of hindsight, audit procedures were not effectively
applied or generally accepted accounting principles had not been

sufficiently narrowed to deal appropriately with new forms of

business transactions.

None of these shortcomings would have

been cured by the rotation of auditors, restrictions on the
scope of services of auditors, different methods of appointment

or remuneration of auditors or transfer of the audit function
to a governmental body.

The problems that have been encountered are to a large
extent inherent in the difficulties in accounting for and reporting
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in a highly condensed format on the operations of large complex

corporate structures.

Impairment of the independence of auditors

is not a principal or fundamental cause of the few shortcomings
that have been encountered in audited financial statements.

Auditors have, overall, displayed a remarkable degree of objectivity
and integrity in fulfilling their role and are likely to do so
in the future without changes in the present system of constraints.

